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Sierra Leone is a case of state collapse, in which the conflicts of the 1990s were not an 
independent event but merely the work of the maggots on a dead body.  Thus no intervention 
could have done anything more, at best, than removing the momentary parasites taking 
advantage of the situation.  It would require a longer, deeper, and more sustained effort of the 
Sierra Leoneans, necessarily with help from the international community, to restore a functioning 
political, economic and social structure necessary to prevent a recurrence of conflict.  At the 
same time, it is noteworthy that this internal conflict was not an ethnic conflict, despite some 
secondary ethnic ramifications.  
 The collapse of the Sierra Leonean state, already a weak creation of colonization and 
decolonization, took place under the long reign of Siaka Stevens (1968-85) and his All Peoples 
Congress (APC) drawing primarily on the interior Temne and Limba people from the northern 
part of the country, reacting against the previous predominance of the coastal Mende people 
from the south and east.  Collapse was consummated under Stevens’ handpicked, inept 
successor, Gen. Joseph Momoh, overthrown by dissatisfied junior officers led by Capt Valentine 
Strasser in April 1992. The main rebel groups operated under the name of the Revolutionary 
United Force (RUF), led by ex-cpl  Foday Sankoh and Samuel Bokarie and operating with the 
active support of the rebel movement and then the government of Liberia under Charles Taylor. 
The rebellion expanded into neighboring countries and then wore down under the falling away of 
external and internal support. 
The subsequent decade after the first coup saw a seesaw of controls over the capital, 
Freetown, and the rest of the country by various loyal and dissident military  and rebel groups, 
interrupted in 1996 by the free and fair election of  Ahmed Tajan Kabbah.  Strasser’s colleague 
Capt. Maada Bio took power in January 1996 to prevent Strasser from delaying a planned 
transition to elected.  Bio re-launched negotiations with the rural rebellion and handed over 
power to Kabbah in March 1996.  Kabbah continued negotiations begun by Bio and made 
substantial concessions to the rebels that paved the way for the Abidjan Agreement of November 
1996.  In the third attempt since the elections, junior officers led by Maj. Johnny Paul Koromah 
overthrew Kabbah in May 1997 and promptly made common cause with the rebels.  Kabbah was 
restored to power ten months later, and again chased out of the capital for several months in early 
1999, before being restored once again.  During this period, a legitimate civilian government was 
in place (scarcely in power) only from the March 1996 elections until the May 1997 coup, from 
March 1998 until the end of the year, and again after the spring of 1999—four years.  
 External intervention to contain the conflict was practiced by three agents: the essentially 
Nigerian force of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations Observer/Armed Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL), and the British Army.  Three peace agreements were signed as a 
result: the Abidjan Accord of November 1996, the Conakry Peace Plan of October 1997, and the 
Lome Peace Agreement of July 1999.  All failed. Rebellion, intervention, and state collapse all 
continue to cohabit in Sierra Leone. 
I: Conflict 
  
  The tinder for the conflict began to gather under the Momoh regime when the government 
stopped paying salaries, notably to its school teachers and military (Hayward 1989; Luke & 
Reilly, 1989).  Structures of authority disintegrated; unemployed youth wandered the streets of 
Freetown and the interior, and took to drugs and petty crime; and soldiers turned to brigandage.  
Disaffected soldiers were the political entrepreneurs who took the match to the tinder.  The 
actual outbreak of the Sierra Leone conflict began as an offshoot of the Liberian civil war and 
evolved into a full-fledged internal conflict over power and resources with heavy regional 
undertones. The rebellion begun in March 1991 when ex-corporal  Sankoh, formerly jailed for 
his participation in a coup against Stevens in 1971, led his rag-tag band of Sierra Leonean 
dissidents backed by Liberian fighters and mercenaries from Burkina Faso, to invade Sierra 
Leone from Liberia (Abdullah 1998; Koroma 1996). Sankoh had met Taylor of Liberia in the 
1980s during  guerrilla training in Libya; Taylor supported the RUF in order to force the 
Freetown government to change its Liberia policy, which included a contribution of 500 troops 
to ECOMOG, the use of Luingi airport as a base for ECOMOG operations, and provision of 
sanctuary for the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), a group of 
former Liberian President Samuel Doe’s followers, as they opened a front against Taylor's 
rebellion from Sierra Leone.  
     Sankoh’s stated aim was to fight the corruption of the Momah regime.  However, when 
Momoh was overthrown by his junior officers a year after the RUF rebellion broke out, the 
rebellion continued against the new government.  27-year-old Capt. Valentine Strasser (who 
promised to end war and restore economy within a short time) overthrew Momoh on April 29, 
1992. This latest coup d’etat prompted the use of force by ECOMOG and following  talks in 
Conakry, Kabbah was restored to power several months later. Many different types of factors 
combined to aid the spread of the conflict and rendered it intractable. These can be grouped as 
contextual aspects related to state collapse, the dynamics of the conflict, and the nature of the 
conflict resolution efforts. 
 
1.      The context of state collapse 
     While state collapse is recognized as providing the basic opportunity that leaders and their 
followers seized to carry out the conflict, it also subdivided into a number of specific areas where 
the state no longer performed its core functions, leaving them up for grabs by  diverse agencies.  
Not all these agencies were hostile to the state, but the fact that they performed state functions 
further weakened the state as much as did the rebellion itself.  These functions include general 
order, territorial control, population control, control over armed forces, and provision of security. 
A weak state system and economic decline hampered the government's ability to respond 
effectively to the rebellion.  By the early 1990s, Sierra Leone's economy was in decline and 
plagued by official corruption that was generating mass discontent and political instability.  
Political uncertainty and economic decline undermined effective policy-making and diminished 
public confidence in the state's ability to secure its interests and lives.  Coup plots were rife as 
Momoh's sole legal party struggled to negotiate a long delayed transition to a multiparty system.  
The state's security apparatus was also in complete shambles as wages failed to keep up with 
inflation or remained unpaid for weeks.  Army morale continued to sink to new lows; soldiers 
begun moonlighting as rebels and joined in looting and harassing the peasantry.  The net effect 
was a government that had to turn to foreign actors for security assistance.  
Involvement in the Liberian Civil War increased since 1991 until  Sierra Leone became 
simply a theatre in that conflict, with little control over its own territory.  Military units from 
Nigeria and Guinea joined the Sierra Leone army in mid-1991 and helped to recapture several 
towns from the RUF.  This infuriated Taylor who threatened attacks on Lungi airport and 
launched cross border raids in support of the rebels.  Sierra Leonean troops responded with their 
own attacks on rebel bases inside Liberia.  Sierra Leone by default had become a new front of 
the Liberian conflict and so by May 1992, the Nigerian and Guinean presence was transformed 
into a regular ECOMOG mission.  
On the other side were ULIMO and other Doe-loyalists who had fled to Sierra Leone and 
joined in counter-offensive measures against Taylor's forces. The government's failure to 
exercise control over such elements provided an excuse for Taylor’s retaliations that fuelled 
escalation and occasionally tipped the scales in the RUF's favor.  ULIMO's attacks were sporadic 
and disrupted attempts to bring the conflict under control.  Early efforts by ECOWAS to broker a 
peace agreement in 1991, for instance, were interrupted by ULIMO's forays into Liberia. The 
RUF then also used the foreign presence as an excuse for reneging on agreements reached with 
the government. 
     Refugees have had a complex effect on the conflict.  As thousands of Liberian refugees 
fled to the eastern part of Sierra Leone, equal numbers of Sierra Leoneans fled into Guinea and 
Liberia.  Refugee populations served as recruitment pools for the rebellion as well as adding to 
the economic hardships of the host communities.  In Sierra Leone, the criss-crossing of refugees 
added to the fluidity of the crisis.  Guinea became a new front in the conflict, as did several other 
states in the West Africa subregion that played host to Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees, 
notably the Casamance dissidence in Senegal and neighboring Guinea-Bissau drew rebels of 
fortune from the Sierre Leonean conflict.  Refugees attracted internal humanitarian aid workers 
whose presence invited hostage-taking by the RUF; the RUF also took peacekeepers hostage for 
use as leverage in negotiations.  This strategy sometimes backfired when it occasioned the entry 
of other parties on the side of the government. The RUF also launched repeated attacks on the 
peasantry and took ordinary people (as well as non-military foreigners) hostage as a way of 
forcing the government to make concessions. Government compliance with such demands 
weakened it substantially, but non-compliance led to deadlocks and escalation in the conflict. 
      Privatization and alienation of security functions have been a specific result of state 
collapse.  With the collapse of the army, the government increasingly relied on private and 
foreign security agencies for protection, many of which were also affiliated with mining firms.  
These actors “privatized” the conflict and introduced the ethos of commercial profit seeking as a 
major current underlying the conflict.  The government’s need to elicit the help of private 
security was exacerbated by two additional factors: the inadequacy of assistance received from 
ECOMOG and UNAMSIL, and the imposition of UN arms embargo on all parties to the conflict.  
The effectiveness of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL was hampered by the absence of a UN Security 
Council authorization to use force.  The foreign forces also lacked adequate knowledge of the 
terrain as well as the capacity to deal with the guerrilla tactics employed so efficiently by the 
RUF.  Fluctuations in numbers caused by periodic troop withdrawals by some contributors also 
meant that the peacekeepers were not a reliable security force for the Sierra Leonean 
government.  Private security firms therefore had to be employed to supplement the 
peacekeepers and provide strategic training for the Sierra Leone army.  The UN arms embargo, 
on the other hand, meant the Sierra Leonean government could not obtain the ammunition and 
weapons it needed to pursue the war and had to rely on private groups such as Executive 
Outcomes and Sandline International for arms shipments. 
      Private specialty groups have also taken over other state functions.  The government 
needed to continue extracting whatever resources still available from the diamond-mining sector 
to finance its war operations.  The RUF’s presence in some of the diamond regions posed a 
security problem which was resolved through cooperation with another category of private 
specialty entities willing to provide security for mining operations and to pay the government in 
cash or in kind for a role in the diamond fields. Groups such as Diamond Works and its 
subsidiary, Branch Energy, had to find their own security for mining operations in the Koindu 
area.  Other commercial mining operations secured assistance from a wide array of private 
specialty groups (examples include British companies such as Lifeguard, Defense Systems Ltd, 
Sky Air, Occidental, and American companies such as Military Professional Resources Inc. 
[MPRI] and International Charters Inc.).  Most of these commercial and security firms also had 
important connections with major players in the conflict and this further complicated the roles of 
those players in the search for a solution.  
  
2. Conflict dynamics and escalation  
      The very dynamics of the conflict provide another element that contributed to its 
intractability and hampered the search for a negotiated settlement.  As the conflict evolved, the 
proliferation of parties on both sides and the RUF’s resort to unconventional warfare thwarted 
efforts at resolution.  
       Proliferation of parties, particularly on the side of the government, characterizes  the 
Sierra Leone conflict.  Political instability fed uncertainty and often benefited the rebels who 
took the opportunity to form alliances with supporters of removed regimes. Sierra Leone had five 
different governments in the decade since the outbreak of violence. Each of the post-Momoh 
regimes came to power promising a swift end to the war and proceeded to reach out to the rebels 
with upgrades in offers that yield no corresponding dividends.  The RUF also suffered its share 
of political uncertainties, so that it became difficult to know with whom to negotiation and on 
whom to rely for implementation of an agreement.  A rift between Sankoh loyalists and 
followers of Sam Bockarie unsettled peace agreement s in 1996, although it did little to weaken 
the RUF.  Attempts in March 1997 to remove  Sankoh (who had been detained in Nigeria) from 
the RUF leadership weakened negotiations but not the RUF.   Such political uncertainties disrupt 
peace efforts, delay the implementation of agreements, and provide opportunities for escalation.  
  Use of unconventional tactics in the conflict frustrated the government army and its 
supporters, many of who lacked training and experience with guerrilla warfare.  The RUF knew 
the terrain and on two occasions, late 1994 and late 1998, executed the same swing westward and 
then southward from their bases to the outskirts of Freetown.  Well-planned guerrilla attacks also 
helped the RUF seize hundreds of pro-government peacekeepers and relief workers at will. In 
May 2000, they took about 500 UN peacekeepers hostage, and two months later, they seized 
another 233 peacekeepers (mainly from India) at Kailahun. As a precondition to negotiations 
with the Sierra Leonean government and British officials, the RUF demanded diplomatic 
recognition, armament and medical supplies from London as well as an end to British military 
assistance to the Strasser government.  The RUF also seized eight foreign nationals and several 
local employees during attacks on mining installations owned by the Sierra Leone Ore and Metal 
CO and Sierra Rutile Ltd as well as seven catholic nuns (Italians &Brazilians) in the Kambia 
area. These and other hostages were used as leverage during talks brokered by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.  The RUF also often demanded in exchange for releasing its 
hostages, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Sierra Leone.  
 
  
3. Conflict Resolution Efforts 
     Resolution efforts were also misguided in important aspects.  Inadequate diagnosis, 
inappropriate agreements, and the premature exit of peacekeepers undermined crucial 
dimensions of the peace efforts and contributed to prolonging the conflict.   
Diagnosed as merely an extension of the Liberian conflict, the Sierra Leone conflict was 
not understood in terms of its own causes and dynamics.  While the conflict may have begun, in 
part, as an auxiliary of the Liberian war, it took hold because of the ready context within Sierra 
Leone and it soon became a full-fledge civil war with its own dynamics and issues.  The 
international community, however, continued to perceive it as a subset of Liberia until the mid-
1990s.  As a result Sierra Leone did not receive any substantial international attention until much 
later when the conflict had grown in scope and become complicated and intractable.  
International interventions were therefore late in coming and often inadequate. 
     Unbalanced agreements have been the result of all mediation attempts.  The conflict has 
witnessed three major attempts at finding a negotiated settlement.  Each was based on the 
principles of power sharing, amnesty for the RUF, and removal of foreign forces in the conflict.  
The first, the Abidjan Peace Agreement of  November 1996, was brokered by President Henri 
Konan Bedie of Cote d'Ivoire with the governments of Bio and Kabbah.  It required the Sierra 
Leonean government to remove all foreign troops assisting it in the war.  Government 
compliance weakened it so much that the RUF could afford to renege on its promised 
demobilization. The Abidjan “bad deal” cost Kabbah the presidency six months later when 
Johnny Paul Kromah exploited its weak position  to launch a successful coup d’etat that 
eventually drew escalation from ECOMOG.  
       The second Agreement, the Conakry Peace Plan of October 1997, was negotiated by 
ECOWAS to restore the Kabbah presidency, but it ended up granting legitimacy to the Koromah 
junta that had gone into partnership with the RUF.  After Conakry, the junta began asserting 
itself as a legitimate government with a mandate to rule till the 22 April 1998 handover date 
when president Kabbah was to return to Freetown.  It accumulated weapons and exhibited signs 
of non-compliance with the terms of the agreement.  Eventually ECOMOG had to employ force 
to expel them from Freetown.  
       The third accord, the Lome Peace Agreement of July 1999, made considerable power-
sharing concessions to the RUF which made the government very unpopular among ordinary 
Sierra Leoneans who expected the Foday Sankoh to be put on trial for crimes against humanity.  
Lome also created the false impression that the conflict’s end was near and therefore hastened 
the withdrawal of some ECOMOG contingents that, once again, strengthened the rebels and 
encouraged non-compliance.  Theagreement’s endorsement by US Secretary of State Madelaine 
Albright was an additional blow to government legitimacy and prospects.  
Premature troop withdrawals and announcements of withdrawals also prolonged the 
conflict by signaling to the RUF that depreciation in government capacity was near. This 
discouraged the rebels from making concessions and instead fuelled sporadic attacks aimed at 
recovering lost ground.  Nigerian president Abdulsalami Abubakar’s January 1999 
announcement of an imminent withdrawal of his country’s troops, for instance, strengthened the 
RUF’s bargaining position at the Lome talks in May of the same year. Though the Nigerian 
pullout was delayed indefinitely, the announcement restored the RUF’s hope of a unilateral 
victory and therefore reduced the incentive for them to comply with the terms of Lome.  The 
withdrawal of the Indian contingent from UNAMSIL in August 2000 was yet another blow to 
the effort to end the conflict.   
 
II: Interventions 
       Each of the three major intervention missions had its strengths and weaknesses.  None 
could have been expected to end the conflict, which is deeply embedded in Sierra Leonean 
society.  Any of them could have been expected to bring the military situation under control, 
although stopping there and confusing military control for conflict end would guarantee the 
reoccurrence of the conflict.  As it is, none of them even brought the military conflict fully under 
control.  The reasons are as political as they are military, but on the military side, appropriate 
numbers, tactics, rules of engagement, and simple command and control over one’s own troops 
were lacking at crucial times, and sometimes throughout the entire operation.  On the political 
side, appropriate mission, financing, commitment, and strategy were required, plus a willingness 





1.      The ECOMOG Intervention 
       The ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone evolved out of ECOWAS’ role in 
neighboring Liberia and also out of previous commitments of two key member states--Nigeria 
and Guinea--to assist the government of Sierra Leone in its fight against the RUF rebels.  Sierra 
Leone's active role in ECOMOG brought retaliation from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) with cross border raids and support for the rebels.  ECOMOG's initial deployment along 
the Sierra Leone-Liberia border in May 1992 was therefore prompted by the dual need to assist 
the Sierra Leone government hold off RUF attacks and to combat NPFL gun-running and 
offensives in the border region. Deployment came at the beginning of violent conflict.  The 
ECOMOG intervention involved troops from ECOWAS members, but almost all of them were 
Nigerian.  By March 1998, its strength stood at 10,000 with Nigeria contributing the largest 
contingent.  The troops were backed occasional by air force and naval units of member states.  .  
       The intervention has undergone several metamorphoses as peacekeepers, combatants, 
and peace enforcers.  Unlike the UN intervention, ECOMOG was unambiguous in its support for 
the government of Sierra Leone and willfully used force to compel the rebels to comply with 
agreements.  Throughout the several phases, ECOMOG's principal goal remained the restoration 
of peace and stability to Sierra Leone, a key supporter of Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS 
and key contributor to the peace enforcement mission in Liberia.  That goal has remained largely 
elusive even though major aspects have been realized.  The intervention did succeed in restoring 
president Kabbah to power, as the first step is restoring the state, through the application of force 
when negotiations and sanctions proved ineffective. ECOMOG's other goal was to help the state 
of Sierra Leone develop its own security apparatus sufficiently to manage the peace and provide 
a stable environment for national reconstruction efforts. This long-term goal has also not been 
realized. The intervention has also not reduced the possibility of future conflicts in Sierra Leone. 
       The ECOMOG intervention could have been improved in many ways.  The early 
mistakes were associated with ECOMOG performance in Liberia, where ECOMOG came in in 
order to save Doe and beat Taylor, rather than to restore the state that Doe had destroyed.  Thus, 
an early  operation in 1990-91 to bring Taylor to power under controlled conditions, before his 
rebellion had broken down into internecine warfare and his forces had disintegrated into child 
soldiering and moneymaking, would have precluded the creation of a rebellion in neighboring 
Sierra Leone.  Thereafter, an early use of force against the rebels could have averted some of the 
escalations that followed the Strasser coup.  ECOMOG could also have benefited from proper 
coordination and better management.  Many of its offensive missions were carried out by the 
Nigerians, whose determination to use force whenever possible was not evenly matched by other 
contingents.  In some instances, poor strategy cost the mission dearly.  The 2 June 1997 standoff 
with the RUF-backed Koromah Junta at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, for instance, resulted in the 
capture of ECOMOG troops and led to civilian casualties in neighboring Murray township.   
The central role played by Nigeria, a country whose terrible human rights record was 
attracting international condemnation and sanctions, also hurt ECOMOG’S ability to attract 
much needed international financial support.  It also prevented Britain, a key actor in the Sierra 
Leone situation, from working together with ECOMOG in the search for a negotiated settlement.  
Had the US, for instance, provided financial support for the essentially Nigerian force of 
ECOMOG at the end of 1998, the return of the AFRC/RUF and the pressure for a Lome 
Agreement would have been avoided.  On the other hand, ECOMOG depended on Nigeria, the 
only country willing to finance and man the operation.  The intervention could have benefited 
from a joint-leadership arrangement involving a neutral state such as Senegal or Mali. Such an 
arrangement  could have enhanced ECOMOG's credibility while allowing Nigeria to play its 
dominant military role, although it would have posed major problems of coordination and 
command since the two armies were based on different colonial military systems and different 
languages.    
       The ECOMOG mission was essentially military.  ECOWAS members assumed state 
sovereignty and reckoned that when the rebellion was suppressed, a full and effective state 
would remain; to question this assumption would have been to question their own existence.  
This assumption underlay the one effective accomplishment of the ECOMOG intervention, the 
1996 presidential election.  ECOMOG offered the rebels several opportunities to concede 
peacefully and even held back to give peace agreements --such as Conakry and Lome that 
"rewarded" the rebels--a chance to succeed.  The rebels continually reneged on the agreements, 
forcing ECOMG to continue the use of force as the primary mode of transforming the conflict.  
That strategy did not always work well but when it did work, it forced the rebels to comply and 
contributed toward the search for peace. 
        The ECOMOG intervention had no credible exit plans. It was initially conceived as a 
mission–creep from Liberia that would cease when that conflict was resolved.  However the 
Sierra Leone problem grew in scope and transcended the Liberian war.  ECOMOG's exit 
therefore became linked to successful resolution of the war. This was an untenable situation for 
several contributing states that faced financial crisis and security problems of their own.  The 
largest and wealthiest contributor, Nigeria, announced its intent to withdraw from the 
interventionon the eve of Lome, before negotiations were completed or the conflict was over.  
That announcement was prompted by rising costs and a transition to democratic governance in 
Nigeria following the sudden death of Sani Abacha, the dictator who had kept Nigeria in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia for several years.  In the end the Nigerians delayed their exit, however the 
cost of the intervention forced them to seek a partnership with the United Nations intervention 
that had had an appalling record in Sierra Leone.      
  
2. The UN Intervention 
       The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL/ UNAMSIL) was 
first established by UNSC resolution 1181 of 13 July 1998 as a disarmament monitoring force of 
70 military observers for an initial period of six months. Its deployment was prompted by 
optimism that followed the successful expulsion of the Johnny Paul Koromah/RUF junta from 
Freetown by ECOMOG and the restoration of the Kabbah regime.  The intervention was to 
monitor ECOMOG’s efforts to disarm the RUF combatants and to help restructure the 
government’s security forces.  It also hoped to document reports of on-going atrocities and 
human rights abuses committed against civilians by both ECOMG and the rebels.  The mission 
failed to accomplish any of its goals and was hurriedly evacuated when the RUF re-launched its 
offensive to retake Freetown.  Only the Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer 
remained in the country.  However on the on the eve of the Lome Talks, the UN agreed to station 
some 2101 military observers in the country upon the request of the government.  
        The second wave of UN presence (UNAMSIL) was authorized by UNSC resolution 
1270 of 22 October 1999 under Chapter VII following the “success” of Lome, when both parties 
had agreed to a ceasefire in order for the rebels to disarm.  It was prompted by Nigerian 
announcements of an impending withdrawal from Sierra Leone, as Sierra Leone and ECOWAS 
                                                 
1 As of 30 July 1999, there were only 49 military observers and 2 troops, supported by a 2-person medical team. 
The civilian component of UNOMSIL as of 4 June 1999 was  29 international civilian personnel and 24 locally 
recruited staff (UNOMSIL website).  
  
  
requested an increased role by the UN to ensure that all parties fulfill the terms agreed upon at 
Lome.  It was therefore perceived as a post-conflict monitoring mission.  The RUF favored a UN 
presence because it did not trust Nigeria and ECOMOG to be impartial in the execution of the 
intervention mandate.  However, sporadic violence continued and led to a quick abandonment of 
several of the terms agreed at Lome.  The consequences for the UN were dire as the Mission’s 
troops became prime targets for abduction by the rebel alliance.  Key contributing parties 
withdrew their troops causing the mission great embarrassment and limiting its effectiveness.  
This second UN intervention involved a much larger force of 6,000 troops consisting of six 
infantry battalions and a helicopter-borne rapid reaction force, half of the troops coming from 
ECOWAS (again, mainly Nigeria) and the rest from India, Kenya and Zambia.  
      The principal goal of UNAMSIL was to ensure that all parties adhered to the terms of 
the Lome Agreement.  Towards this, it planned to monitor the disarmament process, facilitate the 
resettlement of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia, and assist the government to 
develop its security apparatus.  The intervention also investigated human rights abuses 
committed by both government loyalists and the rebel alliance.  On a less formal basis, the 
intervention hoped to facilitate further talks on the power sharing deal agreed upon in Lome.  In 
the end it spent most of its resources negotiating the release of its own troops taken hostage by 
the RUF. 
      The greatest improvements would have required a different set of rules of engagement 
appropriate to the situation.  The UN did not authorize the intervention to use force in its 
operation, even thought it was established under Chapter VII.  It was also concerned about 
cooperating too closely with ECOMOG troops who were considered as being biased towards the 
government (Alao 1998).  These were issues that limited the effectiveness of UNAMSIL.  It is 
likely that a proper identification of the rebels as the villains in the conflict could have helped to 
authorize an intervention whose  sole purpose was to help the legitimate and democratically 
elected government of Sierra Leone regain control of its territory and population, restore its state, 
and end the rebel insurgency.  After the UNOMSIL debacle at the end of 1998 and the 
authorization of UNAMSIL in 1999, the UN should also have authorized a change in mandate to 
peace enforcement.  Such a move could have averted the embarrassing episodes of hostage-
taking that continue to plague the mission. 
The UN intervention in Sierra Leone was instrumental in legitimizing the Lome 
Agreement that endorsed the RUF as a partner in government.  That agreement was largely 
unpopular among civil society as it banned on-going efforts to put the RUF leadership on trial for 
human rights violations.  The presence of UNAMSIL, however, facilitated the repatriation of 
some refugees and helped the government’s effort to raise funds for reconstruction. Despite its 
ineffectiveness as a military force, the intervention helped bring much needed credibility to the 
peace process. Unfortunately that process was not used to end the crisis in Sierra Leone. 
The first UN intervention had a clear exit plan. It was mandated for a period of six months 
subject to review as necessary. When the conflict intensified to a point where the intervention 
considered its mandate untenable, it quickly withdrew.  The second installment, on the other 
hand, entered with an open-ended commitment to monitor the implementation of the Lome 
Agreement.  Ithe UN Security Council did not modify its rules of engagement even as its forces 
came under persistent RUF attack.  Contributing states such as India therefore withdrew their 
troops when they perceived the intervention as unhelpful to their interests.  Such unilateral 
withdrawals hurt the overall purposes of the mission, although it was the only way contributing 
states could exit the process in the absence a general UN policy on collective exit. 
The mission’s principal goal of facilitating the implementation of the Lome Agreement 
was largely unattained. This is due to its ineffectiveness and the government’s continued  
weakness in the face of RUF atrocities. The disarmament process agreed upon in Lome is  yet to 
be completed and there are indications that the RUF will continue to violate the terms of the 
accord as long as the UN intervention abjures the use of force in response to attacks on its 
personnel.    
  
3. The British Intervention 
The British intervention—“Operation Palliser”--was triggered by the "disappearance" of 
500 United Nations Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone.  The withdrawal of ECOMOG troops in late 
April 2000 created a huge security vacuum that United Nations peacekeepers under force 
commander Vijay Jetley of India were unable to fill.  The RUF exploited the situation to escalate 
its attacks on the UNAMSIL.  500 UN troops were taken prisoner by the RUF in May, 
prompting the UK to dispatch a "rescue" force to the country.  The British deployment came in 
the aftermath of the major clashes of the war and as Liberia, a major backer of the RUF, was 
seeking international legitimacy and therefore had become less visible as a threat. The presence 
of the United Nations force (UNAMSIL) also eased the British entry by helping to legitimatize 
the intervention.  The intervention comprised  800 paratroopers, with strong air force and naval 
support.  
The British intervention sought to realize several immediate and long-term goals. In the 
short term, the mission sought to reverse RUF gains and change the conflict structure in favor of 
pro-government forces.  To accomplish this, it launched an operation to rescue the 500 "missing" 
United Nations peacekeepers and also to repel the imminent RUF capture of Waterloo and 
possibly Freetown.  To save Freetown,  troops were dispatched to secure the local airport and 
then deployed throughout the capital and its environs as a buffer to the RUF offensive.  The 
long-term goals were geared toward capacity building assistance to help pro-government forces 
consolidate the gains of peace and security.  To this end, the British troops provided technical 
training and assistance to the Sierra Leone army that had been in complete disarray following the 
sudden death of  its Nigerian Chief of Staff , Gen Maxwell Khobe, in April 2000.  British experts 
also assisted the UN in tactical planning and strategic deployments as well as with logistics such 
as helicopters to transport Jordanian peacekeepers to defensive positions.  
Earlier deployments to help ECOMOG and UNAMSIL could have averted some of the 
more dangerous dynamics that necessitated the British entry in May 2000.  There were several 
occasions where British intervention could have deterred the RUF from employing abductions as 
a concession-seeking tool.  In January 1995, the RUF seized several employees (including 8 
foreign nationals) during its capture of the mining installations of the Sierra Leone Ore and 
Metal CO and Sierra Rutile Ltd.  The rebels also captured seven Italian and Brazilian nuns and 
several Sierra Leoneans in a later raid on Kambia.  British intervention as in May 2000 could 
have achieved similar goals at that stage of the conflict.   Another point where a British presence 
could have positively impacted conflict dynamics is February 1997 when the Kabbah 
government was most vulnerable after sending home all mercenaries in fulfillment of RUF 
conditions for disarmament.  Under the terms of the agreement, the RUF was ready to accept 
foreign observers to monitor its disarmament exercise. The British mission could have 
constituted the core of such an international presence and help raise the cost of defection for the 
RUF.  As it turned out, the RUF failed to disarm and continued to violate the peace agreement 
leading to newer levels of escalation on both sides.  When UN troops were first deployed, on 22 
October 1992, a British intervention could have altered the negative trends of the conflict.  Since 
the first battalions of Kenyan and Indian troops were largely unprepared for the task bequeathed 
them by the withdrawing ECOWAS troops, a British presence could have fortified their strategic 
operations and helped the UN better handle escalations by the RUF, which demanded that the 
UN pay for surrendered arms. This was also a period when Foday Sankoh's grip on the RUF 
began to weaken and so a better equipped unit such as a British intervention could have hastened 
a break up of the RUF and hastened the demise of the rebellion. 
The British mission was short-lived and geared toward the accomplishment of relatively 
limited goals that gave a much-needed boost to government forces but nevertheless produced 
little lasting effect.  Its capacity development program was crucial to the emergence of 
UNAMSIL as a credible force in Sierra Leone; however longstanding operational difficulties as 
well as the UN's reluctance to authorize the use of force, robbed the UN mission of opportunities 
to reverse RUF gains in the conflict.  The military and non-military balance remained constant 
over the period of intervention even though the intervention evolved into a technical support 
group later and its size was drastically reduced to 251 members 
It is certain that the British originally intended the intervention to be a “rescue mission”.  It was 
supposed to be a short, precise trouble-shooting mission that would avoid mission creep, deliver 
quickly, and exit as soon as possible.  However events on the ground convinced the British to 
tackle capacity building as a way of ensuring that their exit would not create an imbalance 
similar the  one created by the ECOWAS disengagement.  
The immediate goals were better defined and hence easier to achieve than the long-term 
goals. As a direct result of the intervention, the RUF was forced to release the 500 UN hostages. 
The British impact was felt again, in late August 2000 when the  West Side Boys (a pro-AFRC 
faction originally supportive of the government)   abducted eleven British soldiers and a Sierra 
Leonean as leverage for the release of their  leader. The British troops intervened to secure their 
release just as the United Nations was dealt a heavy blow by India’s announcement of a pullout. 
British assistance was also directly responsible for the successful deployment of the Jordanian 
contingent in Sierra Leone. Without their helicopters and operational cover, the Jordanian troops 
could have become stranded or restricted to non-contested terrain while the RUF continue to 
devastate the diamond-rich northwest.  
In terms of long-term goals, the impact of the British intervention was quite muted, above 
all because of the advanced stage of disrepair into which the government army had fallen before 
the intervention.  Poor training and lack of adequate equipment was exacerbated  by petty 
quarrels among the ranks and with allies such as the Kamajor militias.  British capacity-building 
effort yielded better results for UNAMSIL, which became more professional and superbly 
handled the rescue of  233 peacekeepers (mainly from India) held hostage by RUF in Kailahun 





 The conflict in Sierra Leone has dropped in intensity in 2001, for a number of different 
reasons mainly unrelated to the interventions themselves  RUF members have accepted to join 
programs of Disarmament, Demobilization, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (DDRR), at least in 
the first phase, although there is still little economy into which to integrate.  The RUF has lost 
much of its appeal as its various experiences in Freetown and in the countryside alike have 
shown it to have no goal, no program, and no governing ability.  Under international pressure, 
Taylor has pulled back Liberian support; the evolution toward collapse in neighboring Ivory 
Coast also reduced support for Liberia and introduced distracting complications as the forces of 
Gen. Guei, reputedly close to Taylor, predominated in the western part of the country bordering 
on Liberia. 
 There are many lessons from the Sierra Leone case of multiple interventions.  The first 
double lesson is that military intervention is not enough to end conflict whose basic cause is state 
collapse, but that military intervention is a necessary ingredient in engaging the road to conflict’s 
end.  The conflict began in the failure of governance, the dissolution of the economy, and the 
breakdown of the social tissue in Sierra Leone, and will only end when these elements are 
restored.  That is a statement of shocking realism, and while it may sound like a counsel of 
perfection in an imperfect world, it does stand as a guideline for the sustained, broadbased, 
committed efforts needed to restore Sierra Leone.  Violent conflict, even in the outrageous form 
practiced by the RUF, is a symptom of a deeper malaise. 
If such conditions are not dealt with, the cancer in the region, only in remission, will 
again emerge to eat away at the countries around it.  One cannot isolate Sierra Leone and tow it 
out to sea; it is part of a regional rot and, to broaden the challenge even further, needs to be 
handled in its context.  As seen, early and late the interventions needed to be conducted in 
relation to the Liberian conflict and its aftermath, and as the conflict continued, it had its own 
spillover into Guinea and its secondary effects on Guinea-Bissau and Senegal.  The latter is not 
an object of control measures, but the Guinean extension poses its own Sierra Leonean-type 
problems: Reinforcement of the Guinean military reinforces the autocratic tendencies of Guinean 
president Lansana Conte and creates conditions for a similar type of rebellion in Guinea, a state 
on the way to its own form of collapse. 
 On the other hand, the military intervention is an important element in the process of 
bringing the conflict under control.  When the RUF arose, it was necessary to take adequate 
measures to stop it in its tracks.  These measures would have been best taken by the regional 
organization or a single country acting in its name, and secondarily by a UN operation (squarely 
under Chapter VII, not shakily so or under Chapter VI), but in fact it took a British intervention 
to show the necessary military commitment and centralized strategy and command.  Appropriate 
measures should necessarily have begun in Liberia, in the context of the Liberian war, in early 
1991 (Zartman 2001). The need for decisive military action continued in 1992 with a focussed 
strike against the RUF by ECOMOG early on; realistically, it need be noted that ECOMOG in 
1992 was in deep trouble in Liberia and there was no Sierra Leonean army to rely on.  
Thereafter, there were moments, particularly after 1996 when the Liberian civil war was 
officially ended, in late 1998 and early 1999, and in early 2000, when ECOMOG or UNAMSIL 
needed to act as a unified military force with an enforcement mission and active rules of 
engagement.  The longer one waits, the larger the force commitment required. 
 The Sierra Leone experience raises enormous questions about the non-military side of the 
conflict management operation.  Conflict management “doctrine” indicates that one can only end 
a conflict by negotiating with one’s enemy and that any party to the problem must be a party to 
the solution.  Yet there are limits, if not on the participants, at least on the conditions under 
which their participation can be envisaged.  Some enemies are beyond the pale, incapable of 
making and holding an acceptable agreement (Stedman 2000).  Which enemies is a judgment 
call, not easy to make: The deliberate atrocities of the RUF, whose hallmark was amputation, 
made them appropriate objects of punishment, not power-sharing, but what about Renamo in 
Mozambique or UNITA in Angola Taylor’s NPFL or for that matter either the Palestinians or the 
Israelis in the Middle East?  It is too easy to qualify one’s enemy as beyond the pale and not 
worthy of negotiation. 
 Suggestions for an answer to the conundrum come out of the Mozambican experience.  
Despite its vicious past, Renamo was not only a necessary participant in negotiations if the 
conflict was to be ended, but also an organization which had already made a good deal of 
progress from a guerrilla movement toward a political party when the negotiations started.  As 
such, it was not only organizationally coherent but also began to see a stake in electoral 
participation and in transformation of the conflict to political means.  No such indications were 
available from the RUF.   
 The other side of the answers return the analysis to the military situation.  In cases where 
the enemy does not seem capable of transforming its struggle into a political contest by the rules, 
military control is necessary.  As noted, this is not to be confused with elimination of the broader 
and deeper causes of the conflict, which if not treated will give rise to a new insurgent 
expression, but it does indicate that in some cases if any negotiation is to take place it will be 
between victors and vanquished, not equals.                                                                                                              
